Hofstra Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 2

Article 5

2001

Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the
Messenger for the Sake of the Message?
Lisa R. Nakdai

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nakdai, Lisa R. (2001) "Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messenger for the Sake of the Message?," Hofstra Law
Review: Vol. 30: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss2/5

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Nakdai: Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messenger for th

NOTE
ARE NEW YORK'S ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS
KILLING THE MESSENGER FOR THE SAKE OF
THE MESSAGE?
I.

ITTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, New York experienced an overwhelming
problem with drug addiction and drug-related crime.' Citizens of the
state had reached the peak of their frustration with the legal system-a
system they felt was no more than a "revolving-door [of] criminal
justice."2 Nelson A. Rockefeller, then Governor
of New York, knew that
3
the drug problem was not getting any better.
In the 1960s, the trend was to reserve severe sentences for higherlevel drug traffickers while providing treatment for lower-level
offenders.4 However, people began to fear for their safety from drug
offenders, especially when rehabilitation programs had only limited
success in treating addicts.5 Furthermore, drug dealers were pleading
guilty to lesser charges, discouraging courts and police from enforcing
the law. 6 In order to battle what he called a "reign of fear," Governor
Rockefeller proposed legislation that would deter drug offenders from
committing narcotics-related crimes.7 The Governor and the Legislature
believed that these laws would decrease drug trafficking and drug-

1. See Annual Message from Gov. Nelson Rockefeller to the Legislature of the State of New
York (Jan. 3, 1973), in 1973 N.Y. Laws 2309, 2317 [hereinafter Annual Message].
2. Id. at 2317-18; see, e.g., Randy Kennedy, Drug Court Seeks End to Revolving-Door
Justice,N.Y. IMEs, May 22, 1996, at B3.
3. See Annual Message, supranote 1, at 2317.
4. See Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American
Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 39-40 (1995).
5. See Annual Message, supranote 1, at 2317-18; see also infra note 301.
6. See Annual Message, supranote 1, at 2318.
7. See id. at 2317-18.
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related crimes in New York State.8 These laws were enacted in 1973 and
imposed severe, mandatory penalties on all levels of drug-offenders. 9
Part II of this Note will discuss the laws commonly known as the
Rockefeller Drug Laws and the results of their enactment. It will discuss
the changes in arrest rates, the number of individuals sentenced, the
types of individuals arrested and sentenced, and the costs to the State.
This Part will also analyze the disparate impact that the Rockefeller
Drug Laws have on minorities and women.
Part III discusses why some people think the laws are beneficial
and should remain intact. Part IV examines criticisms of the Rockefeller
Drug Laws and alternatives to them. Also analyzed are the criticisms and
problems that may be encountered with proposals for change.
Part V concludes that judicial discretion is absolutely necessary in
drug sentencing. When mandatory sentencing laws are in place,
discretion is essentially left in the hands of prosecutors who lack the
objectivity of judges, and whose decisions are not reviewable.

II. THE LAWS
The Rockefeller Drug Laws require the mandatory imprisonment of
drug offenders for all levels of offenses.'0 The Rockefeller Drug Laws

8.

See id. at 2318.

9. See JOINT COMM. ON N.Y. DRUG LAW EVALUATION, NAT'L INST. OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT: THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW,
EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 3 (1978) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT].
10. See, e.g., Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 276 §§ 220.21, 220.43, 1973 N.Y. Laws 371, 380-81
(codified as amended in N.Y. PENAL LAW) (explaining that criminal possession of two or more
ounces of a controlled substance and criminal sale of one or more ounces of a controlled substance
are Class A-I felonies). In 1979, the Legislature doubled the weight of the drug required for an A-I
felony to two ounces or more for possession and four ounces or more for sale when it felt that the
laws "'were not conducive to efficient drug law enforcement."' Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Is it Time to

Change the Rockefeller Drug Laws?, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 613, 625 (1999) (quoting
Paul Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, in N.Y. PENAL LAW, at 7 (McKinney 1980)); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCES FOR NEW YORK DRUG OFFENDERS 6-7 (1997)

[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH]. New York Penal Law Section 70.00 discusses the mandatory
sentencing maximum and minimums. The pertinent part of the statute for mandatory maximum
sentencing is as follows:
1. Indeterminate sentence. Except as provided in subdivisions four, five and six, a
sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be an indeterminate sentence. When such a
sentence is imposed, the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the
provisions of subdivision two of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment
shall be as provided in subdivision three of this section.
2. Maximum term of sentence. The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be
at least three years and the term shall be fixed as follows:
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divided New York State Class A felony charges into three categories."
Classes A-Il and A-IfI were created to focus solely on drug crimes.
A second law known as the "Second Felony Offender Law" was
enacted along with the Rockefeller Drug Laws. 3 The law requires long

prison terms for individuals who commit a second felony within ten
years of a prior felony conviction.14 The Legislature had two goals in
(a) For a class A felony, the term shall be life imprisonment;
(b) For a class B felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed
twenty-five years ....
(c) For a class C felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed
fifteen years;
(d) For a class D felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed
seven years, and
(e) For a class E felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed
four years.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney Supp. 2001); see also id. § 70.00(3) (discussing indeterminate
minimum periods of imprisonment).
11. See JOINT COMw=rITE REPORT, supra note 9, at 149.
12. See id. The 1979 amendments to the Rockefeller Drug Laws eliminated Class A-Ill
classifications and reclassified them as Class B felonies. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 10, at 7 n.14.
13. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06 (McKinney 1998); see also Christopher S. Wren, Critics
Say Rockefeller Drug Laws Pack the Prisons,ForcePlea Deals and Hit Small-Timers the Hardest,
N.Y. TwIEs, Jan. 19, 1998, atB1.
14. See N.Y. PENAL LAw §70.06. The law states:
1. Definition of Second Felony Offender.
(a) A second felony offender is a person, other than a second violent felony offender as
defined in section 70.04, who stands convicted of a felony defined in this chapter, other
than a class A-I felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate
felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of this subdivision.
(b) For the purpose of determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate felony
conviction the following criteria shall apply:
(i) The conviction must have been in this state of a felony, or in any other
jurisdiction of an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess
of one year or a sentence of death was authorized and is authorized in this state
irrespective of whether such sentence was imposed;
(ii) Sentence upon such prior conviction must have been imposed before
commission of the present felony;
(iii) Suspended sentence, suspended execution of sentence, a sentence of probation,
a sentence of conditional discharge or of unconditional discharge, and a sentence of
certification to the care and custody of the division of substance abuse services,
shall be deemed to be a sentence;
(iv) Except as provided in subparagraph (v) of this paragraph, sentence must have
been imposed not more than ten years before commission of the felony of which
the defendant presently stands convicted;
(v) In calculating the ten year period under subparagraph (iv), any period of time
during which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of
commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present
felony shall be excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or
periods equal to the time served under such incarceration;
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mind when it enacted this law: (1) To deter prior felony offenders from
committing additional crimes; and (2) to incarcerate those felony
offenders who were not deterred by the law, thereby ensuring that they
could not commit any further crimes.' 5 The true result, however, was to
leave judges with no discretion to order treatment or any other
alternative to incarceration for these predicate drug felons. 6
A. Arrests, Sentencing, and Costs
The enactment of the Rockefeller Drug Laws led to several
significant changes.'7 As a result, drug felonies are considered the
"single most significant factor underlying the remarkable growth of the
prison population[]" in New York. 8 Law enforcement responded
aggressively to the spread of drugs, causing an enormous increase in the
number of individuals arrested and the number imprisoned.' 9 In 1980,
there were 27,407 drug arrests in New York State.2 Less than 900 of
these arrests were felony drug offenders sentenced to New York State
prisons. 2' By 1999, the number of arrests rose to 145,694-a 430%
increase.' In that same year, the number of felony drug offenders
arrested increased by 1000% to nearly 9000 (about 46% of all those
incarcerated), 23 while the number of judgeships in the state courts saw a
mere 15% increase. 24 This flooded the courts with more drug cases than
they could manage.
Imprisonments also steadily increased beginning in 1973 and
continued a steeper rise through the 1980s.2' Thirty-three percent of
(vi) An offense for which the defendant has been pardoned on the ground of
innocence shall not be deemed a predicate felony conviction.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06(1) (McKinney 1998); see also Wren, supra note 13.
15. See JOINT COMMrrrEE REPORT, supranote 9, at 10.
16. See Rockefeller Drug Laws-20 Years Later: Hearing Before the Assem. Comm. on
Codes, 1993 Leg., 216th Sess. (N.Y. 1993) [hereinafter Coughlin] (testimony of Thomas A.
Coughlin III,
State
Corrections
Commissioner),
available
at
http:llwww.druglibrary.orglschaffer/nisclcoughlin.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
17. See id. (stating that the Rockefeller Drug Laws caused new incarcerations for drug
felonies to increase from 713 in 1974 to 11,000 in 1992).
18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 2.
19. See id. at 12.
20. See N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS AND THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE CYCLE OF
ADDICTION AND RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 10 (2000) [hereinafter
REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE].

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 1.
id. at 10.
id. at 1, 10; John R. Dunne, Change the Drug Laws, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 1999, at 2.
REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supra note 20, at 10; Dunne, supra note 23.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 12.
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individuals convicted of drug crimes were sentenced to state prison or
local jail between 1972 and 1973."' As a "direct result" of the mandatory
sentencing and plea-bargaining limits of the Rockefeller Drug Laws,
these convictions increased to 44% between 1974 and 1976.f The prison
population changed from 9% of inmates serving sentences for drug
felonies in the 1980s to 34% in the late 1990s.2
The number of individuals sentenced under the Second Felony
Offender Law was even higher. According to Thomas A. Coughlin, the

New York State Corrections Commissioner, 68% of drug offenders
imprisoned in 1993 were sentenced under the Second Felony Offender
Law.' That number increased to approximately 72.8% in 1997:1 Despite
the increase in individuals sentenced, the law failed to lower the

recidivism rates of felony offenders 3' as Governor Rockefeller had
hoped.32 The percentage of prior felony offenders rearrested before and
after the implementation of the Second Felony Offender Law was 79.8%
and 79.5%, respectively.33 Therefore, the Rockefeller Drug Laws have

shown a minimal deterrent effect on prior felons.
The individuals hit hardest by this law are the nonviolent offenders
convicted under the lowest felony class available.4 Only 3.4% of
individuals sentenced after an A-I felony conviction in 1995 were repeat
offenders.3 5 In comparison, 64.6% of Class D felons36 and 61.1% of

26. See JOINT CofmmrTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 15.
27. Id. Despite the fact that the chances of incarceration increased for those defendants
convicted, the Joint Committee Report claims that there was an identical chance of receiving jail
time prior to and subsequent to the enactment of the laws. See id.at 16. This discrepancy may be
due to an increase in the time required to process drug cases. See id. at 17. The time doubled
Furthermore, by
between 1973 and 1976 while it remained the same for other felony cases. See id.
1976, cases were backlogged over one year despite the addition of thirty-one new courts. See iL For
statutes such as these to be effective the Joint Committee felt that "efficiency, morale, and capacity
of the criminal justice system" are even greater factors in determining whether the law will be
effective than the statute itself. Id.at 25.
28. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 12.
29. See Coughlin, supranote 16.
30. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 13.
31. See JoINT COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 9.
32. See supra text accompanying note 15.
33. See JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 67.
34. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 10.
35. See id. at 13.
36. See id. An example of a Class D felony is the sale of any amount, or possession of 500
milligrams of cocaine. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.06(5) (McKinney 2000). The mandatory
sentence for a nonviolent second felony offender under Class D carries a minimum of 2-3.5 years
and a maximum of 4-7 years. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06(3)(d)-(4)(b) (McKinney 1998).
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Class E felons37 were sentenced as repeat offenders. 8 Only 7.6% of
individuals admitted to prison for drug felonies in 1995 had prior violent
felony convictions.39
Along with an increase in arrests and sentencing came an increase
in the number of defendants sent to state prison. In 1970, courts
sentenced 470 drug offenders to state prison.40 By 1990, that number
increased to 10,785 and remained over 10,000 throughout the 1990s.4 '
Approximately 21,000 people were in prison for drug offenses by 1996.42
By the end of 1998, drug offenders made up 33% of the entire New
York State prison population.43
Lifetime prison sentences were rarely, if ever, imposed on drug
offenders prior to the implementation of the laws." But, under the
Rockefeller Drug Laws, 1777 individuals received lifetime sentences
between 1973 and 1976. 45 Corrections Commissioner Coughlin
concluded that, at the time of his testimony, "[t]he totality of overall
drug commitments ha[d] increased at an astronomical rate and...
significantly surpasse[d] commitments for violent felonies and other
coercive crimes." 46
The increase in arrests and sentencing cost the state a substantial
sum of money. In 2000, approximately 22,150, or 31%, of inmates in
state prison were incarcerated for drug crimes at a cost to the state of
$29,000 each.47 By contrast, drug-free outpatient care costs about $2700
to $4500 per person per year; and residential drug treatment expenses
are $17,000-$21,000 per individual per year. 4 During 2000, New York
37. Examples of Class E felonies are criminal injection of a narcotic drug, criminal use of
drug paraphernalia in the second degree, and criminal possession of "precursors" of controlled
substances. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.46, 220.50, 220.60 (McKinney 2000). The mandatory
sentence for a nonviolent second felony offender charged under Class E carries a 1.5-2 year
minimum and a 3-4 year maximum sentence. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06(3)(e)-(4)(b)
(McKinney 1998).
38. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 13.
39. See id.
40. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supranote 20, at 12.
41. See id. This excludes 1999 where the number was 8521. See id.; see also HuMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 10, at 13 (stating that 10,000 people annually are sent to prison for drug
felonies in New York).
42. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 13.
43. See Lindesmith Ctr.-Drug Policy Found., Rockefeller Drug Law Fact Sheet, at
http://www.soros.org/lindesmith/citessources/rockefellerfact2.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter Lindesmith].
44. See JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT; supranote 9, at 16.
45. See id.
46. Coughlin, supranote 16.
47. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supranote 20, at 12.
48. See Lindesmith, supra note 43.
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State spent approximately $650 million housing drug felons.49 The state
also spent a substantial amount of money on processing the drug cases in
the court system. According to the Office of Court Administration, New
York State's lower courts spent $151.5 million handling misdemeanor
cases during the 1999-2000 fiscal year.50 Twenty-six percent of these
cases were drug cases.51 The state's upper courts spent $278.7 million
handling indictments, 41% of which were drug cases.5 z The total cost to
the court system to adjudicate the drug cases during the 1999 calendar
year reached $115 million. 3 When the laws were first enacted, the State4
spent approximately $32 million on implementation and enforcement.5
The Lawyers Coalition of Criminal Justice members noted that, since
1983, the state has built approximately 29,000 prison cells, indicating a
cost of around $5 billion to maintain the laws. 5
At the time these laws were enacted, the Legislature could not have
imagined the workings of the current drug system," or have realized that
these laws would not be effective in diminishing drug trafficking.

Finally, Corrections Commissioner Coughlin concluded that if the public
was aware that the "8 to 25 year maximum sentencing range [was the

same] for a person who commits a forcible rape as for a person who sells
a dollar's worth of cocaine" the public would agree that these laws are
"totally out of whack.""

49. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supra note 20, at 12. The costs of housing a drug felon in
New York City have increased to a substantial $47,000 annually. See id. This means that because
most of the state's nonviolent offenders are imprisoned there, New York City spends a significantly
at 26-27.
greater amount of money on housing drug felons than most other counties. See id.
50. See id. at 11.
51. Seeid.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See JOINT CONMrITEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 11.
55. See Gary Spencer, New Defenders' Group Formed To Lobby State Legislature,N.Y. L.J.,
May 29, 1992, at 1.
56. When the laws were enacted the purpose was to threaten drug lords with severe penalties
in the hopes that they would be deterred from committing crime. See David C. Leven, Our Drug
Laws Have Failed-So Where is the DesperatelyNeeded Meaningful Reform?, 28 FORDHAM URB.
LJ.293, 293 (2000). However, today's reality is that many individuals imprisoned under these laws
are low-level drug offenders who become dealers to finance their own habits. See id. Therefore,
drug trafficking has not diminished as expected. See id. Furthermore, many individuals that are
imprisoned were hired as mules to transport drugs by drug lords that want to stay out of prison. See
infra text accompanying notes 59-66.
57. See Coughlin, supra note 16.
58. Id.
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B. Effects on Drug Use and Related Crime
Despite the sizeable number of individuals arrested and imprisoned,
there was an insignificant change in the use of drugs and drug-related
crimes immediately after the laws' enactment." The majority of
individuals arrested and incarcerated under the Rockefeller Drug Laws
are low-level offenders such as couriers, ° steerers,6 or lookouts. 62 These
arrests have a minimal effect on the overall number of drug crimes
because these offenders are usually hired by "drug kingpins" to traffic
the drugs. 6' Thus, after lower-level offenders are arrested, the drug
crimes continue because major drug dealers simply hire new
traffickers. 65 Former State Senator John R. Dunne summarized it best:
"Drug kingpins will rarely if ever be foolish or reckless enough to be
caught carrying narcotics, and if they are caught they have more
66
information to trade and, thus, can cut better deals with prosecutors."
1. No Prior Convictions for the Majority of Those Sentenced
At least 95% of individuals charged as drug couriers had no
previous criminal involvement and no criminal record. 67 In 1997, 55% of
all Class A felons had no prior convictions and 41.6% had never been
arrested.68 That year, nearly 80% of all drug offenders sent to New York
State prisons were never before convicted of a violent felony and nearly
half had never been arrested for a violent felony. 69 Sixty percent of the
drug offenders in New York State prisons were convicted of Class C, D,

59. See JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supranote 9, at 7-12.
60. A courier "[t]ransports or carries drugs with the assistance of a vehicle or other
equipment." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENDERS WITH
MINIMAL CRIMINAL HISTORIES app. B (1994) [hereinafter DOJ].

61. A steerer "[a]rranges for two parties to buy/sell drugs, or directs [a] potential buyer to a
potential seller." Id.
62. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 15. A lookout is defined as someone who
"performs [a] very limited, low-level function in the criminal activity ... includ[ing] running
errands, answering the telephone, receiving packages, packaging the drugs." DOJ, supra note 60,
app. B.
63. Drug kingpins are also known as "high-level dealers." See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 10, at 15. A drug kingpin is one who "[plurchases or imports drugs near the top of the drug
distribution chain, and distributes drugs to other high-level or mid-level dealers; or leads, directs, or
otherwise runs a significant drug organization." DOJ, supranote 60, app. B.
64. See Dunne, supra note 23.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 20.
69. See Lindesmith, supranote 43.
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or E felonies involving minimal drug amounts. ° Therefore, the goal of
the drug laws, to deter drug traffickers from continuing in the drug
trade,7 ' has not been achieved because major traffickers and dealers are
still on the streets selling drugs while petty drug offenders are sent to
prison.
2. Crime Rates Have Increased
According to statistics, the Rockefeller Drug Laws have failed in
their attempt to reduce crime. Despite the prison population being at its
highest, crime rates still increased 2% between 1979 and 1988 and again
in 1989. 73 Similarly, other studies have shown these laws have little
effect on crime and drug availability.74 In New York State, serious
property crimes, usually associated with heroin users, saw a dramatic
increase between 1973 and 1975, the years immediately following the
enactment of the Rockefeller Drug Laws. 75 This indicates that the laws
did not deter drug use or drug crimes. Addicts continue to support their
habits through crime without fear of punishment under the harsher drug
laws.76 The individuals incarcerated are the nonviolent, low-level
offenders that are not committing drug-related crimes but habit-related
crimes.'n
3. Drug Use and Drug Sales Have Remained Steady
The Rockefeller Drug Laws also had little or no effect on the use
and sale of drugs. Heroin use was the same in New York State three
years after enactment as it was when the laws were first implemented. 78
70. See id.
71. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 2.
72. See The Sentencing Project: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security and the
Subcomam. on Gov't Info., Justice, & Agric. of the House Gov't OperationsComm., 101st Cong. 347
(1990) [hereinafter Mauer] (testimony of Marc Mauer, Assistant Director, The Sentencing Project),
availableat http'.//lww.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/testmny.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
73. See id.
74. See Susan N. Herman, Measuring Culpability By Measuring Drugs? Three Reasons to
Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laivs, 63 ALB. L. REV. 777, 782 (2000) (stating that drug
availability did not decrease and crime increased); see also JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 9.
REPORT, supra note 9, at 9. Felonious property crime increased
75. See JOINT COM =rrlEE
15% between these years. See id.
76. See id. at 10.
77. See id.
78. See iit at 7. Heroin sellers became more secretive in their dealings and some addicts
sought out treatment for a period of about one year after the law's enactment. See id. at 37.
However, the New York City Police Department and drug treatment centers believed that the law
had very little long-term effect on heroin use and dealing. See id. at 37.
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Furthermore, following the enactment of the Rockefeller Drug Laws,
drug use remained stable in five of New York State's largest counties, 7
even though there was an increase in the number of prison and jail
sentences imposed. 0
C. DisparateImpact on Minorities
The Rockefeller Drug Laws have not only been criticized for their
failure to deter crime, but also for their disparate impact on minorities
and women. 8' Michael J. Gorman, a lawyer and New York City Police
Lieutenant, stated that this fact is attributable to the disparate treatment
of minorities by the police.2 He noted several factors in support of this
statement. First, he explained that racial profiling" allows police to take
race and ethnicity into account when stopping someone to search or
question them." Consequently, blacks and Hispanics account for 86% of
all felony drug arrests and close to 86% of all persons indicted for drug
felonies. Second, police focus their drug arrests on inner-city
neighborhoods as opposed to affluent communities, 86 because drug sales
are more visible in low-income neighborhoods and poor individuals are
less politically threatening." Furthermore, the political and legal risks of
making a mistake or violating an individual's civil rights are much
greater in wealthy neighborhoods, as compared to low-income
communities, where defendants cannot afford high-priced lawyers and
are less likely to sue.n Finally, drug treatment is very costly and may not
be available to an individual without adequate resources. As a result,
treatment becomes available only for the affluent, mostly white
individuals.89 These factors, coupled with the mandatory sentencing
79. See id. at 19. The counties are: Erie, Monroe, Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester. See id.
80. See id.
81. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE
WAR ON DRUGS, at Fig. 1 (2000) [hereinafter HRW, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE]; Johnson, supra
note 4, at 42-45; Tracy Huling, Women Drug Couriers:Sentencing Reform Neededfor Prisonersof
War, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1995, at 14, 18-19.
82. See Michael J. Gorman, Letter to the Editor, Racial Disparity Seen in Drug Enforcement,
N.Y. L.J., May 15, 1998, at 2.
83. Racial profiling has been defined as "the police practice of stopping, questioning, and
searching potential criminal suspects in vehicles or on the street based solely on their racial
appearance." HRW, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE, supranote 81, at 22.
84. See id.
85. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 14.
86. See Gorman, supra note 82.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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requirements of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, ensure that the number of
minorities in prison is substantially greater than the number of nonminorities. 9
These consequences are in fact, a reality. Minorities account for
94% of those in prison for drug offenses while whites make up only
5.3% of those incarcerated for drug crimes in New York.9 One out of
every four black men and one out of ten Hispanic males between the
ages of 20-29 is either in prison, in jail, on probation or on parole for
drug-related crime.' In comparison, only one out of sixteen white males
are incarcerated, or have been incarcerated, for drug-related crimes.93
From 1984 to 1988, even though blacks only account for 12% of
individuals using illegal drugs, the number of blacks arrested for drug
crimes increased from 30% to 38%." Blacks make up 54% of the prison
population but only 18% of the state's residents. 95 Forty-five percent of
blacks, 59% of Hispanics, and only 16% of whites imprisoned in 1994
were sentenced for drug crimes.96 Because they are more likely to be
arrested than whites, blacks and Hispanics are adversely affected by the
Rockefeller Drug Laws, even though they are less likely to use drugs.
D. DisparateImpact on Women
The laws not only target ethnic minorities but they also have a
disparate impact on women. The application of the Rockefeller Drug
Laws in Queens County sentenced 83% of Hispanic women charged
with an A-I felony to state prison in comparison to 50% of white women
and 52% of black women. 97 On December 31, 1998 there were 3504
women in New York State prisons.9" Approximately 2000 or 56.3% were
there for drug offenses.? Additionally, 91% of the women drug
offenders are minorities-54.3% are black, 36.7% are Hispanic, and
only 8.4% are white.'0° Out of thirty-seven states studied, New York sent

90. See id.
91. See HUMAN

RIGHTs WATCH, supra note 10, at 5; Dunne, supra note 23; Gorman,
supra note 82.
92. See Mauer, supranote 72, at 343.

93. See id.
94.

See id

95. See HRW, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE, supra note 81, Fig.2.
96. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 14.
97. See Huling, supranote 81, at 19.
98. See Lindesmith, supranote 43.

99. See id.
100. See ia
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68%, the highest percentage, of women to state prison for drug
offenses.'0 '
Other studies reveal that the laws also prejudice black women.' °2
Black women are unemployed or working in lower paying jobs more
often than whites.'0 3 Additionally, 44% of black households are headed
by females compared to only 13% of white families in the United
States.' 4 This makes these women more likely to be impoverished.' 5
Accordingly, low-income black women are more likely to be induced to
look for income to support their families through criminal activity.'0 6 The
drug laws, coupled with these facts, have helped lead to black women
accounting for over 45% of the women in United States federal
prisons.'07
The Rockefeller Drug Laws are criticized as prejudicial not only
toward minority women, but also toward women generally. 2 Seventy
percent of women sent to prison for drug crimes are compelled to
become involved in drug smuggling by their boyfriends or spouses who
use force to ensure that the women assist them.0 9 If these women are
caught smuggling drugs they are charged with A-I felonies and, if
convicted, face a mandatory minimum prison sentence of fifteen years to
life."0 Kidnappers, arsonists, and even murderers receive the same
penalty,"' even though women convicted of these types of drug crimes
are not violent criminals.
Although men risk receiving similar sentences, the problem for
women arises when "[t]he penalties [are] appl[ied]without regard to the
circumstances of the offense, the offender's character or background, or
whether the person is a first-time or repeat offender."' 2 For example, in
People v. Thompson,"3 the defendant was a first-time offender convicted
of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree." 4 The

101. See HRW, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE, supranote 81, tbl.19.
102. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 4, at 7, 10 (discussing how black women are more likely
than white women to be in poverty and, therefore, more likely to turn to crime).
103. See id. at 32.
104. See id. at 43.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 32.
107. See id. at 42.
108. See Johnson, supranote 4, at 41-45; Huling, supra note 81, at 18-19.
109. See Dunne, supranote 23; Huling, supranote 81, at 59-60.
110. See Huling, supranote 81, at 15.
111. Seeid.
112. Id. at 17.
113. 633 N.E.2d 1074 (N.Y. 1994).
114. See id. at 1075.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss2/5

12

Nakdai: Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messenger for th
20011

ROCKEFELLERDRUG LAWS

defendant was a seventeen-year-old girl living with her uncle who the
police recognized as "the principal target of their investigation and
prosecution.""' Ms. Thompson was arrested after being employed in her
uncle's drug business and making a single sale of cocaine to an
undercover police officer."' Ms. Thompson was offered a sentence of
three years to life as a plea bargain and then four years to life
immediately before trial; she rejected both offers."7 An appellate court
sentenced her to eight years to life imprisonment but the New York
Court of Appeals increased her sentence to the mandatory minimum of
fifteen years to life required by the Rockefeller Drug Laws."' The court
reasoned that any amendments to the statutes are in the hands of the
legislature, not the judiciary. 19
Although Angela Thompson went to trial, most women pleabargain to a reduced charge.'20 Concern for children and family drives
them to accept a plea even if it is harsh as compared to the circumstances
of the crime.'2 ' In addition, although it is possible to exchange assistance
to the police for a sentence of lifetime probation, most women are
involved so minimally that any assistance they can provide is of little or
no value, which makes this option virtually unavailable.'2
The prejudices these laws impose have led to a substantial increase
in the number of women in prison.'2 In a ten-year span, from 1983 to
1993, the number of women in state prisons rose from 610 to 3553.24
The number of women convicted in New York State as first-time
offenders increased 147% between 1988 and 1991.' Women committed
to state prisons under the Second Felony Offender Law increased
276%.26 In Queens County alone, the statistics on females charged with
A-I felonies shows that 70% of those arrested between 1986 and 1990

115. Id. at 1081 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 1075; see also id. at 1081 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 1082 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 1075.
119. Seeid.at 1081.
120. See Huling, supra note 81, at 19. Women usually plead guilty to an A-I felony because it
is the lowest charge available. See id. An A-il felony carries, at its minimum, a sentence of three
years to life. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.00(2)-(3)(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
121. See Huling, supranote 81, at 19.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 15; see also Johnson, supranote 4, at 43-44.
124. See Johnson, supranote 4, at 42. The number of women in city jails increased from 310 to
2000 in the same time period. See id.
125. See id. at 43.
126. See id. This statistic demonstrates that the Second Felony Offender Law has harsher
effects than the laws for first-time offenders. See id.
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were sent to state prison.' 27 Sixty-five percent of women convicted of a
Class A felony had no prior criminal record and 84.3% of women had no
prior felony arrests, compared to 39.6% and 65.8% of men,
respectively.'28 Male imprisonment increased 11.7% from 1987 to 1989
while the number of women imprisoned increased 24% during the same
period.'29 From 1987 to 1989, the incarceration rate for new drug3
commitments increased 98.9% for women, but only 33.5% for men. 0
Just over 60% of women are in prison for drug-related crimes, while
only 32.5% of men are imprisoned for similar crimes. 3' Overall, the
Rockefeller Drug Laws' mandatory sentencing requirements, combined
with the fact that most women have low-paying jobs, have caused an
increase32 in the number of women turning to crime and ending up in
prison.
IlH.

SUPPORT FOR THE LAWS

Although many criticisms and negative consequences have
surfaced, some individuals still believe that the Rockefeller Drug Laws
are more beneficial for New York State than judicial discretion in
sentencing.3 3 Supporters believe that the severe mandatory sentences
deter offenders from committing crimes and keep communities safe by
incarcerating those who commit crimes for a substantial period of
time.TM Additionally, prosecutors feel that the threat of a long sentence
provides incentives to low- or midlevel dealers to give the police
information regarding major drug dealers in exchange for lighter
sentences.' 35 Although information received by lower-level offenders
should ideally lead to the arrest of drug lords;
there has been little, if
36
any, empirical data to prove that this occurs.1
127. See id. at 44.
128. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 20.
129. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 43.
130. See id. at 44.
131. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 7.
132. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 41-45.
133. See, e.g., Gary Spencer, DAs Fire Back in Debate on Drug Laws, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 1999,
at 1 (stating that prosecutors are fighting against any major reforms of the Rockefeller Drug Laws
because they believe the laws to be critical in combating the drug problem).
134. See HUMAN RGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 1.
135. See Wren, supra note 13. However, the disparity between mandatory sentences and plea
bargains is often substantial enough that an individual will plead guilty, thereby giving up his or her
right to trial, in order to ensure that he or she will not be incarcerated for a great length of time. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 24.
136. Conversely, the stable price of heroin, the increase in consumption, the stable number of
narcotic deaths, and the increase in admissions into drug treatment programs have the combined
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Second, mandatory sentencing ensures that the same crime receives
the same punishment.'37 This ideology allows for less variability in
sentencing, which some say ensures that race will not play a factor in
determining punishment.' Mandatory sentencing is also beneficial to
society because it leads to less sentencing disparities and guarantees that
all individuals are treated equally. 3 9
Third, supporters argue that there is a correlation between drug
abuse and violent crime. They believe the Rockefeller Drug Laws assist
in reducing violent crime by incarcerating drug offenders." Over 60%
of violent offenders had drugs in their system at the time of arrest. 4'
Since drug abuse costs the United States a substantial amount of
money,"143 many supporters feel this justifies mandatory sentencing laws
as well.
A fourth argument in support of the drug laws is that seemingly
harsh convictions under Class A-I felonies are used sparingly. 4
Between 1994 and 1999, an average of only forty-nine defendants per
year were sentenced for Class A-I drug convictions. 45 Supporters
generally find that mandatory sentencing contributes to a decrease in the
amount of violent crimes and ensures 146that all individuals arrested are
treated equally within the court system.
IV.

CRMCISMS OF THE LAWS AND ALTERNATIVES

Although some see benefits stemming from the Rockefeller Drug
Laws, more see the harsh consequences that result from sentencing

impact of proving that heroin supplies were as readily available a couple of years after the
enactment of the drug laws as they were in 1973. See JOINT CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supranote 9, at 7.
137. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61,123 n.4 (1993).
138. See Mauer, supra note 72, at 348-49. The problem with this argument is that race may not
be a factor in sentencing but it is a factor in arrests which means that more minorities than whites
face the judges for sentencing. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 81-96. Judges
should then have the discretion to offset any disparities caused at the arrest and prosecution level
but the Rockefeller Drug Laws have not allowed for this. See Mauer, supranote 72, at 349.
139. See Lowenthal, supra note 137, at 61-63.
140. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supra note 20, at 91.
141. See id.

142. In 1995, drug abuse cost the United States $109.8 billion. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 92. Class A-I felony convictions are used sparingly but Class D and E felonies
are not, and those are the individuals that account for the majority of drug arrests and sentencing.

See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
145. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supra note 20, at 92.
146. Seeid.at9l.
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under them. 147 As a result, several professionals in the field have come
up with alternatives to these laws.' 8 For example, Arizona 149 and
Michigan 5 ' moved away from some of their harsher mandatory
sentencing laws when the state governments realized that their intended
goals were not being met. 5 '
A.

More Sentencing Discretionfor Judges

One major criticism is that the Rockefeller Drug Laws take
sentencing discretion away from the judiciary.' In turn, the decision of
what sentence to impose is left up to prosecutors who decide what
charges to bring against the defendant. 53 Prosecutors' decisions are
unreviewable and "the criminal justice system lacks mechanisms to hold
prosecutors accountable for their choices. ''1 4 In contrast, the Appellate
Division, in case of any improper decisions by the trial court, may
review judicial sentencing. 5 5 Many proposals try to return discretion to
the judiciary to determine whether a sentence is appropriate under the
circumstances surrounding the crime and the individual.'56
1. Arizona
Like New York, Arizona judges previously lacked judicial
discretion in imposing drug sentences."' As a result of this, the state
resolved to change its mandatory sentencing scheme. 5 A study
147. See id. at 89-90.
148. Some of the suggestions include: (1) repealing the laws, see Editorial, Drug Laws that
Destroy Lives, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2000, at A24; (2) giving judges more discretion in sentencing,
see Dunne, supra note 23; and (3) placing nonviolent offenders in treatment, see REPORT TO JUDGE
KAYE, supranote 20, at 91.
149. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3401 (West 2001).
150. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2001).
151. See Cami Byrd, Legislative Review, Criminal Code Revision, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 341, 34142 (1994); Brian M. Thomas, Recent Legislation, Parole Eligibility-Michigan Eliminates
MandatoryDrug Sentences andAllows Parolefor Possessionof 650 or More Grams of Cocaine or
Heroin, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 679,679 (1999).
152. See Dunne, supranote 23.
153. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 10, at 4; Robert D. Herman & Michelle Ritter
Murphy, Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences-Can They Be Any Less Draconian?, 16 T.M.
COOLEY L. REv. 99, 111-12 (1999).
154. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 10, at 4.
155. See id.
156. See Dunne, supra note 23; see also Gary Spencer, Effort Begun to Ease Rockefeller Drug
Laws, N.Y. L.J.,
May 7, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Spencer, Effort Begun] (discussing the Campaign for
Effective Criminal Justice and its purpose).
157. See Byrd, supranote 151, at 341-42.
158. See id. At the time the mandatory sentencing laws were enacted, the majority view was
at 341.
that judges were exercising too much discretion in sentencing defendants. See id.
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committee created by the Arizona State Legislature in 1991 introduced
Senate Bill 1490, which contained recommendations to change
Arizona's correction system and criminal code. 9 Senate Bill 1490 was
vetoed by then-Governor Symington and the areas of consensus were
reintroduced as Senate Bill 1049, which was signed into law on April
22, 1993260
Mandatory sentencing led to many problems in Arizona including:
"(a) increased severity of sentences; (b) reduction in trials;
(c) prosecutorial rather than judicial control of sentencing; (d) lack of
individualization of sentences; and (e) deterrence issues.' 6' Arizona's
incarceration rate became the eighth highest in the nation and 139%
greater than it had been ten years prior. 62 The possibility of mandatory
sentencing also led to an increase in plea-bargaining, and as a result, a
reduction in trials.' Prosecutors dismissed 76% of their indictments in
return for guilty pleas. 4 This gave prosecutors more influence in
sentencing than judges.' Prosecutors had the power to decide what56
charge to bring against a defendant without a review of their decision'
Senate Bill 1049 was enacted in order to resolve these issues. 67
Prior to Senate Bill 1049, an individual could receive a mandatory
sentence for possession or sale of a drug (other than marijuana)
regardless of the quantity involved.'6 8 After the bill was signed, section
13-3401 of the Arizona Revised Statutes set threshold amounts for
certain narcotics.' 69 A mandatory 70
sentence could not be imposed until
met.
were
amounts
these threshold
2. Michigan
Michigan was another state that realized its mandatory sentencing
laws needed to be changed. When Michigan changed its laws, Michigan
was infamous for its murder rate and politicians felt this was directly

159. See id. at 342.
160. See i. at 342-43.
161. Rudolph J. Gerber, Arizona Criminal Code Revision: Twenty Years Later, 40 ARIz. L.
REv. 143, 162 (1998).
162. See id. at 163.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 164-65.
165. See id.
at 165.
166. See id.
167. See Byrd, supranote 151, at 343.
168. See id. at347.
169. See id. at 346-47; see also ARZ. REV.STAT. ANN. § 13-3401(36) (West 2001).
170. See Byrd, supranote 151, at 347.
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related to the drug traffickers.' One of Michigan's mandatory drug
sentencing laws, known as the "650-lifer-law," was the state
legislature's attempt to alleviate this problem. 72 The law required a
sentence of life without parole for anyone caught with over 650 grams of
heroin or cocaine. 173 The law was enacted twenty-one years ago and
(similar to the Rockefeller Drug Laws) has been the subject of much
debate.' 74 Michigan Governor William G. Milliken, who signed the bill
into law, realized that he made a mistake when he endorsed the
"draconian" law. 75 Although its intention was to imprison drug kingpins
and deter drug crimes, 76its primary effect was capturing one-time,
nonviolent drug couriers.
Like women incarcerated under New York's Rockefeller Drug
Laws, JeDonna Young was sentenced under the 650-lifer-law after
police found a bag of heroin in the car. 77 Even though her boyfriend
admitted the drugs were his, 7 1 Ms. Young, a 25-year-old single mother
with no criminal record, was convicted.' 79 She is one of 173 (out of 205)
prisoners with no previous criminal record serving a sentence under
Michigan's 650-lifer-law.8
Many arguments were set forth in favor of amending Michigan's
law. First, it was difficult to say that the punishment fit the crime
because the law mandated the same punishment for all offenders
regardless of their circumstances."' Hence, the law was incarcerating
addicts who tended to be low-level couriers selling drugs solely to
support their drug habit versus those individuals selling drugs as a
career.1 2 Second, the 650-lifer-law, in comparison with other laws,
seemed extremely harsh. 8 3 Second-degree murder, rape, and armed
robbery all had the possibilities of parole while the only crime with a
punishment harsher than the 650-lifer-law was first-degree murder.'"'

171. See Thomas, supra note 151, at 683.
172. See id.
173. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2001).
174. See Thomas, supra note 151, at 679.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See Young v. Miller, 883 F.2d 1276, 1278 (6th Cir. 1989) (habeas corpus proceeding).
178. See Thomas, supra note 151, at 679.
179. See Young, 883 F.2d at 1283-84.
180. See Thomas, supra note 151, at 680.
181. Circumstances include past criminal record and involvement in the drug scheme. See
id. at 684-85.
182. See id. at 685.
183. See id.
184. See id.
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Third, the chances of acquittal were greater under Michigan's drug laws
because juries were less likely to convict someone under a law with such
a harsh penalty.'" A fourth reason for amending the drug laws was that
major drug dealers hired addicts to transport their drugs rather than
taking the risk of transporting the drugs themselves.'86 Therefore, these
laws ended up providing little, if any, assistance in combating the drug
problem since those being caught were not the drug kingpins.'8 The
high-level dealers will continue using other addicts to sell drugs. Finally,
an amendment to the law was favored because a reduction in prison time
would lead to reduced operating costs for the Department of Corrections,
ultimately resulting in savings for the state. 8
Arguments have also been advanced in favor of the 650-lifer-law.
The theory in its support is: If drugs are connected to violent crimes,
then the elimination of the drug problem should help decrease violent
crime. 9 However, if the people sentenced under the 650-lifer-law are
addicts or first-time, nonviolent offenders, it does not seem likely that
violent crimes will decrease as a result of the law. Some say that
trafficking large amounts of drugs is worse than murder because murder
involves one victim whereas the sale of 650 grams of cocaine or heroin
involves many.' This argument may have some validity; however, it
also shows the need for treatment centers to assist these addicts. Ideally,
with fewer addicts, there will be less people buying drugs, and therefore
less of a drug problem.
Upon the realization that the 650-lifer-law was too harsh, Michigan
State Senator Mike Rogers sponsored a measure to ease the law.' 9'
Governor John Engler signed the amendment into law in 1998 after it
passed the legislature.'9 The amendment provided judges with discretion
in sentencing. 3 They now have the ability to sentence defendants to any
amount of time between twenty years and life imprisonment.'" The
amendment also provided parole for first-time, nonviolent offenders who
cooperated with police and some drug offenders became eligible for

185. See id. at686.
186. See id.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id.
See id. at 690.
See id. at 685.
See id.
See id at680.
See id.

193. See Herman & Murphy, supra note 153, at 109.
194. See id.
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parole after serving fifteen years of their sentence. 19 5 In determining
whether or not to grant parole, the parole board must consider the
individual's criminal record, the circumstances of his or her arrest, his or
her role in the drug sale and whether drugs were sold to someone under
seventeen or in a drug-free school zone.' 96 The parole board may then
grant the prisoner parole with lifetime probation.' The benefit of this
system is that the parole board, in addition to judges, is given discretion
to ensure that kingpins remain imprisoned while couriers and addicts are
released. 98 A final provision of the amendment provides for random
drug testing and the right of the parole board to revoke parole.' 9
3. New York's Proposed Reforms
Even New York State has recognized the need to change the
outdated and ineffective laws. Former State Senator John R. Dunne
organized the Campaign for Effective Criminal Justice ° with the goal of
putting discretion back in the judges' hands. 0 ' Mr. Dunne was a
Republican sponsor of the Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973 and now is a
leading advocate for their reform.m The organization realizes that the
laws have failed and must be revised.' Its goal is to ensure that judges
have the ability to decide whether to sentence nonviolent offenders to
drug treatment as opposed to long mandatory sentences. Mr. Dunne
agrees that the prison systems are overcrowded with low-level drug
offenders, costing the state a substantial amount of money and having
only minor effects on the drug problem 5
The group's proposed bill would give trial judges the power to
depart from the mandatory minimum sentences for all Class A felony
drug crimes by taking the defendant's character into consideration, along
with his or her past criminal record, if any, and the circumstances and

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
politics,
note 23.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See Thomas, supranote 151, at 680, 687.
See id. at 687.
See id. at 688.
See id.
See id. at 689.
The Campaign is described as "a bi-partisan organization of leaders in law enforcement,
business and clergy seeking to change New York's drug sentencing laws." Dunne, supra
See id.
See Spencer, Effort Begun, supra note 156.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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nature of the crime. Judicial discretion is essential to ensure that drug
offenders are given a sentence that reflects their individual situations.'
This discretion would result in more productive and less costly
punishments."
Several other proposals were introduced specific to the A-I
provisions of the Rockefeller Drug Laws."' In 1999, Governor Pataki
proposed what some consider a "weak reform. 210 The Governor's bill
would allow the Appellate Division to review Class A-I drug felony

sentences and, at their discretion, reduce the mandatory minimum
sentence of 15-years-to-life to 10-years-to-life in cases involving firsttime felons.21' This proposal was limited to those defendants convicted
of drug possession, not of drug sales.2 2 The bill would also provide trial
judges with the discretion to divert nonviolent offenders to drug
13
treatment programs, but only with the consent of the district attorney.
The enactment of the Governor's bill was linked to ending parole for

nonviolent felons.

4

Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of the State of New York, proposed a
similar bill to Governor Pataki's. In her 1999 State of the Judiciary
Address she offered two proposals.215 The first would give the Appellate
Division the ability to reduce the minimum period of incarceration for an
A-I felony.1 6 The proposal would allow a judge to decrease a convict's
sentence to 5-years-to-life if the mandatory minimum would constitute a
206. See Gary Spencer, PastSupporters UrgeDrug Law Reform, N.Y. L.J.,
May 13, 1999, at 1
[hereinafter Spencer, PastSupporters].
207. See Dunne, supra note 23.
208. See id.
209. See Pataki to Propose Rockefeller Changes, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 29, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter
Pataki Proposal];Gary Spencer, Kaye Urges Reform of Rockefeller Drug Lavs, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 9,
1999, at I [hereinafter Spencer, Kaye Urges]; James A. Yates, Letter to the Editor, Drug Law
ProposalDescribedas Flawed,N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 12, 1999, at 2.
210. Editorial, New York's Harmful Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2000, at A34. On
April 5, 2001, Governor Pataki introduced another proposal known as the "Felony Drug Law
Reform Act of 2001." For the full text of the bill, see S.B. 4237, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001).
211. See Spencer, PastSupporters,supra note 206.
212. See id.
213. See iL; see also Jonathan Lippman, Interaction Between Legislative, Judicial Branches
Essential,N.Y. L.J.,
May 3, 1999, at S1.
214. See Pataki Proposal,supra note 209.
215. See Hon. Judith S.Kaye, State of the Judiciary Address (Feb. 8, 1999) [hereinafter 1999
Judiciary Address] (transcript available at http://www.courts.state.ny.usctapps/state99.htm (last
visited Mar. 11, 2002)); see also Alan Finder, Top New York Judge Calls for Easing Some Drug
Laws, N.Y. Tlms, Feb. 9, 1999, at B5 (discussing Chief Judge Kaye's proposals); Spencer, Kaye
Urges,supra note 209 (quoting various individuals' feelings about the proposals and the proposals
themselves).
216. See 1999 Judiciary Address, supra note 215.
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"miscarriage of justice. '' 21 7 Chief Judge Kaye's proposal would require
trial judges to impose the sentence required by law and it would provide
the Appellate Division with discretion to reduce the sentence, if
218
necessary.
Chief Judge Kaye's second proposal is directed at nonviolent drug
addicted defendants. 9 The proposal requests that trial courts, with
consent of the prosecutor, have the authorization to defer prosecution of
the case while the defendant completes a drug treatment program.22
While completing this program the defendant will still be under the
authority of the court.221 Chief Judge Kaye proposed the addition of an
Article to the Criminal Procedure Law that would "codify standards for
drug offender diversion programs." m In her 2001 State of the Judiciary
Address, she mentioned her first proposal again and noted that while the
proposal sparked a debate, no reform had been made.m She suggested
that the three branches of government work together to reform the
Rockefeller Drug Laws.2
Both Chief Judge Kaye's first proposal and Governor Pataki's
proposal are flawed because very few people are sentenced under the
Class A felony section of the Rockefeller Drug Laws. m The bigger
problem lies with those sentenced under the Class D and E felonies,26
and these proposals do not discuss change in that area.22 James A. Yates,
a New York State Supreme Court Judge in Manhattan, believes that
Chief Judge Kaye's proposal "relegates the trial court to a clerical or, at
best, advisory role. ' 2' He believes that the proposal is flawed because
the trial court, which is the court most familiar with the facts and
circumstances of a case, has no discretion while the Appellate Division
217. Id. "Miscarriage of justice" was not specifically defined. See id However, Chief Judge
Kaye mentioned that the Appellate Division would be permitted to consider "the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and character of the defendant and public safety concems
in determining whether an injustice has occurred." Id.
218. See Yates, supra note 209.
219. See 1999 Judiciary Address, supra note 215.
220. See id.
221. Seeid.
222. Id. For a more detailed discussion of drug treatment see infra Part IV.B.
223. See Hon. Judith S.Kaye, State of the Judiciary Address 9 (Jan. 8, 2001).
224. See id.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39, 144-45. Chief Judge Kaye was aware that her
first proposal would not affect a large number of defendants. See 1999 Judiciary Address, supra
note 215.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
227. See 1999 Judiciary Address, supra note 215. Chief Judge Kaye noted that her second
proposal would likely affect second offenders charged with Class B felonies. See id.
228. Yates, supranote 209.
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is given a role inconsistent with Article VI of the New York State
Constitution. '9
A bill sponsored by State Senator Lack was introduced to the
Senate on March 22, 1999.m This bill would permit the modification of
Class A-I drug felony cases.2' Intermediate appellate courts can modify
sentences if they are unduly harsh.2 2 The court can also defer
prosecution of certain drug offenses if it sees that the defendant may
have a problem with drug dependency.33 Unfortunately, this bill never
made it past the Senate.23
On January 10, 2001, a bill was introduced to the Senate
Committee on Codes by State Senator Montgomery.3 5 This bill called
for judicial discretion in sentencing for certain Class A and Class B
felonies. 2 6 If the court, after reviewing the history and character of the
defendant and the nature and circumstances of the crime, believes that an
indeterminate sentence is too harsh, then the court may impose a lesser
sentence.' This bill had previously been sponsored by State Senator
Montgomery and introduced on April 18, 2000.2" However, that bill
died in the Committee 3 9 Senator Montgomery noted in his sponsor's
memorandum the justification for the current bill:
Under the existing Rockefeller Drug Laws, judges are now bound
by rigid guidelines requiring stiff prison terms for drug offenses, even
for possession of relatively small amounts of drugs. The sentences
escalate steeply when a person is convicted of a second felony within
10 years. The Rockefeller Drug Laws have led to an explosion in the
state's prison population, which has increased fivefold since the drug
laws were enacted in 1973. As a result, New York taxpayers have
borne the financial burden of building over 40,000 new prison beds at
a cost of over $4 billion. Restoring judicial discretion in the sentencing
229. See iL
230. See S.B. 4009, 222d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999). Senators Alesi, DeFrancisco, Hannon,
Leibell, Maltese, Marchi, McGee, Meier, Padavan, Spano, and Velella were cosponsors. See id.
231. See id. §§ 3-4.
232. See id.
233. See id. § 9.
234. See id.
235. See S.B. 840, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) [hereinafter Senate Bill 840], available at
http://leginfo.state.ny.us (last visited Feb. 20, 2002). State Senators Breslin, Duane, Kruger,
Lachman, Markowitz, Oppenheimer, Paterson, Sampson, Santiago, Schneiderman, M. Smith, and
Stavisky were cosponsors. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See S.B. 7611, 223d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2000). Senators Breslin, Duane, Kruger, Markowitz,
Oppenheimer, Paterson, Sampson, Santiago, and A. Smith were cosponsors. See id.
239. See Senate Bill 840, supra235.
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process would allow judges to utilize less costly and more productive
alternatives to incarceration.
Despite the large support for this and prior bills, to date, no action
has been taken.24'
In addition to the Senate, the Assembly introduced a bill.2 2 The
Assembly's plan takes a bigger step down the path toward meaningful
reform. The Act is known as the "Drug Law Reform, Drug Treatment
and Crime Reduction Act of 2 0 0 1 .'' 3 It was introduced by
Assemblyman Aubry and provides, among other things, for court
ordered drug abuse treatment.2 Only individuals charged with a Class
B, C, D, or E felony would be eligible for this treatment.US While this
bill was referred from the Assembly Committee on Codes, through
Ways and Means to Rules, there has been no action taken since June 25,
2001.26
B. Court Supervised and Enforced Drug Treatment
The realization that drug addicts need treatment has led New York
to take a step towards assisting these addicts.2 47 In order to come up with
an effective solution to New York's drug problem, Chief Judge Kaye
organized a Commission to "document the numbers and types of drug
cases and their cost to the criminal justice system; evaluate the court's
current response to these cases; review innovative and experimental
approaches to the handling of these cases; and make recommendations
24 The Commission focuses on drug treatment and
for future reforms.""
Drug Treatment Courts?49 as alternatives to incarceration because they
have shown both high retention rates and low crime recidivism rates.2 0
Drug Treatment Courts monitor the defendant's progress and
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. See Assemb. B. 8888, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001).
243. Id.
244. See id. § 28.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See Press Release, New York State Unified Court System, A National First: New York to
Launch Systemic Program of Drug Screening and Court-Mandated Substance Abuse Treatment
Statewide 1 (June 22, 2000) [hereinafter Press Release].
248.

REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supranote 20, at iii.

249. "Drug Treatment Courts are specialized court parts that give nonviolent substanceabusing offenders an opportunity to reduce or eliminate criminal justice sanctions if they are
successful in completing treatment." Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
250. See generally id (noting the success of drug treatment courts in decreasing drug use and
drug-related crime).
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compliance with the conditions imposed.25' The Commission proposed
participation in drug treatment programs as an alternative to a sentence
of probation or prison.52 The Commission's reforms were adopted by
New York in 2000, making New York the first state "to adopt a
comprehensive systemic strategy to combat the overwhelming impact of
substance abuse on court caseloads." 3
Currently, there are 450 drug court programs in all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and two federal districts.5"
Approximately 200,000 individuals have enrolled in drug courts since
the first one was established in 1989.5 The United States Department of
Justice has a Drug Court Program Office that administered $50 million
in federal funding for drug courts for the 2000 fiscal year. 2 6
Columbia University's National Center on Addiction and Substance
Abuse reviewed drug court systems throughout the country and
concluded that while participants are in the program, both criminal
activity and drug use rates decline and rearrest rates for drug court
participants are lower.27 Furthermore, urinalysis testing in thirteen of the
courts found that only 10% of the participants tested positive for illegal
drugs while on probation. Comparatively, 31% of defendants on
probation in the same jurisdiction but not participating in the drug court
program tested positive for illegal drugs in violation of their probation.5
Sixty percent of those entering drug courts are still in treatment after one
year while only half of those who voluntarily enter outpatient treatment
stay three months or longer. °
Recidivism rates are also lower as a result of drug court systems.
Thirteen percent of graduates from the Jefferson County Drug Court in
Kentucky were reconvicted of a felony within a year compared with
60% of nongraduates in the same county.26 Rearrest rates are also lower
in Delaware's adult Drug Court; in the Santa Clara County Drug Court

251. Seeid. at 17.
252. See id.
253. Press Release, supranote 247, at 1.
254. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supra note 20, at 17-18.
255. The first Drug Treatment Court opened in Miami because of a substantial amount of
cocaine-related arrests that clogged up southern Florida's court system. See id.
at 17.
256. See id. at 18.
257. See iL at 20-21.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. Seeid.at22.
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in California; and in the Ventura County Drug Court also in California.6 2
These results are far below the rearrest263rate for a comparison group not
participating in the drug court program.
Similar positive results have been reported for the twenty drug
treatment courts currently in operation in New York State. Courts report
60% to over 70% of individuals staying in the program.2 Most courts
report rearrest rates of less than 15% one year after graduation compared
to a 34-35% rearrest rate for those released from state prison or put on
probation.2
The Kings County District Attorney's Drug Treatment Alternativeto-Prison ("DTAP") program 6 was established in 1990.267 It has a 74%
one-year retention rate and a three-year rearrest rate of 23% for
graduates compared to 47% of a nonparticipating group.m The Queens
County District Attorney's DTAP program has a 77.7% overall retention
rate and a 20% one-year rearrest rate for graduates.2 69 These statistics
show the positive effects the drug courts have had on helping decrease
drug use and drug-related crime.
Drug courts not only provide New York State with savings in jail
and prison costs, social services costs, and other costs, but successful
treatment provides additional financial benefits as well.270 For example,
the Erie County Department of Social Services conducted a study of 176
Buffalo City Drug Court graduates."' The study found that 45 out of 106
open social services cases were closed upon graduation, 15 children in
foster care were returned to their families, and 18 Child Protective
Services cases were closed.272 This amounted to savings of $5.6 million
over a five-year period.273

262. See id. Rearrest rates for Delaware, Santa Clara County, and Ventura County were 4%,
3%, and 12%, respectively. See id.
263. See id. The comparison group rearrest rates were 32%. See id.
264. See id. at 23.
265. See id.
266. This is a prosecutor-based program similar to drug treatment courts. Its development is
based upon the belief that the criminal justice system can induce a defendant into a program because
of its substantial leverage. See id. at 50.
267. See id. at 24-25; Steven Belenko, The Challenges of IntegratingDrug Treatment into the
Criminal JusticeProcess, 63 ALB. L. REv. 833, 846 (2000).
268. See REPORTTO JUDGE KAYE, supra note 20, at 25; Belenko, supra note 267, at 848.
269. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supra note 20, at 25.
270. See id. at 4, 25.
271. See id. at 29.
272. See id. at 29-30.
273. See id. at 30.
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The number of drug cases also strains family courts. 4 Children are
removed from their homes due to abuse and neglect by drug-addicted
parents, and the cost of foster care for these children adds to the expense
of drug addiction on the state."s Out of 1.8 million children in New York
City, the Administration for Children's Services had cases open with
almost half a million of them.276 Seventy percent of these children come
from substance-abusing families.2 7 There is a direct correlation between
substance abuse and neglect of children and over the past few years the
number of neglect cases has increased. 278 In New York State in 1995,
16,170 neglect cases existed and in 1999 this number was 23,186.9
Therefore, it is probable that the number of substance-abusing parents
has increased and treatment to rid them of their drug habits is essential.
A solution to this problem is Family Treatment Court.8 These
courts "provide improved screening and assessment of parents with
substance abuse problems; quick access to appropriate treatment ...
sanctions and rewards to motivate [them] ... and heightened
accountability and judicial supervision.""' The family treatment courts
have shown some success thus far. Out of 115 individuals in the Suffolk
County program, only fifteen have been terminated unsuccessfully.8 2 As
of February 2000, out of fourteen family treatment courts around the
country, 60% of individuals have either remained with their children or
have been reunited with them8 3
1. RAND Drug Policy Research Center Study
The RAND Drug Policy Research Center conducted a study
focusing on cocaine and the cost-effectiveness of the federal mandatory
minimum drug sentences. 4 The study concluded that "[m]andatory
minimum sentences are not justifiable on the basis of cost-effectiveness
at reducing cocaine consumption, cocaine expenditures, or drug-related
crime." ' 8 If one million dollars were spent on extending the mandatory
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See itL at 57.
See id.
See id. at 58.
See id.
See id. at 58-59.
See id. at 59.
See id. at 61. These courts are modeled after criminal Drug Treatment Courts. See id.
Id
See id. at 66.
See id.
See JONATHAN P. CAULmNS Er AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES:
THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY? xvi (1997).
285. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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minimum sentences, cocaine use would be reduced by a little under
thirteen kilograms. 6 On the other hand, spending that same amount of
money on treating cocaine users would decrease consumption by a
substantial one hundred kilograms. 28' The study also concluded that
treatment was fifteen times more likely to reduce crime and eight times
more likely to reduce drug consumption than were longer prison terms.
RAND researchers agree that mandatory minimum sentences are
beneficial when it comes to sentencing high-level drug dealers.29
However, the current mandatory minimum laws do not focus on these
dealers. 290
Overall, drug treatment and drug treatment courts have led to a
decrease in drug use, lower rearrest rates, and savings for the state.Y'
They have also assisted in keeping or bringing families back together.
"[T]axpayers' money would be better spent on trying to rehabilitate
mules and small-time dealers rather than on paying for lengthy 29
prison
terms during which they receive no treatment for their addictions."
2. Criticisms of Drug Treatment and Drug Courts
Despite the fact that Chief Judge Kaye believes that "Drug Courts
are one significant step toward breaking the devastating cycle of
persistent nonviolent crime, ' the system has faults. The problem with
drug courts in New York City is the fact that many individuals will not
feel compelled to accept treatment over a sentence. 29 Since New York
City's criminal courts have a caseload in excess of their capacities, most
cases do not go to trial thereby erasing any threat of serious jail time.295
Hence, New York City Drug Courts are more suitable for handling
felony charges as opposed to misdemeanors.296 Since the Rockefeller
Drug Laws provide for felony charges, Drug Treatment Courts may be
beneficial to ease the harshness of the laws. However, drug courts were
only enacted with the purpose of helping nonviolent drug addicted
286. See id. at xvii.
287. See id. at xviii.
288. See Marc Mauer, Why are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?,11 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 9, 13 (1999).
289. See CAULKINS ET AL., supranote 284, at xxv.
290. See id.
291. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supranote 20, at 44-46.
292. Herman & Murphy, supra note 153, at 122.
293. Hon. Judith S. Kaye, State of the Judiciary Address (Jan. 10, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/soj2000.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2002)).
294. See REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supranote 20, at 41-42.
295. See id. at 42.
296. See id. at 41-43.
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offenders.297 The Rockefeller Drug Laws have disparate impacts on a
larger group of people than those covered by the drug courts.
The Commission itself describes drug treatment courts as "coerced"
drug treatment. 8 Many criminal justice and political leaders treat
coerced drug treatment skeptically because they believe that
2 9
"involuntary" patients are poor prospects for rehabilitation.
Furthermore, the drug courts are intended for low-level, nonviolent
offenders who have less of an impact on crime and costs than serious
offenders3 r° Some offenders caught in possession of large quantities of
drugs have drug problems and are in need of treatment but they are not
able to receive the benefits of these programs.,O'
Another negative effect, specific to the DTAP program, is that it
requires defendants to plead guilty to a felony prior to being accepted
into the program.3 2 Therefore, by way of the Second Felony Offender
Law, a defendant is vulnerable to higher sentences if he or she violates
the law again and had already plead guilty to get into the program. 3
Charles D. Adler, a Manhattan criminal defense lawyer who advocates
for alternative sentencing, believes that the Second Felony Offender Law
will end up incarcerating more people than the first-time offender laws
because defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offense on their first
charge become convicted felons facing mandatory prison terms for a
second offense.
V.

CONCLUSION

There has long been a conflict among "the criminal justice view [of
drugs and crime], which emphasizes detecting and punishing drug
offenders, and the public health view, which advocates treating the drug
addiction that leads some individuals to commit crime." 35 Governor
Nelson A. Rockefeller enacted the Rockefeller Drug Laws in order to
297. See supra note 249.
298. REPORT TO JUDGE KAYE, supranote 20, at 4.
299. See Belenko, supranote 267, at 844 n.63.
300. See id. at 846.
301. See id. People may consider these individuals a danger to society because of the large
amount of drugs they possess. This is why judicial discretion is extremely important. Judges should
decide whether these individuals should be sentenced to prison, sent to treatment, or a combination
of the two.
302. See id. at 847.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
304. See Wren, supranote 13.
305. Deborah W. Denno, When Bad Things Happen to Good Intentions: The Development and
Demise of a Task Force Examining the Drugs-Violence Interrelationship,63 ALB. L. REv. 749,
750-51 (2000) (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
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deter drug sales and drug consumption; he wanted to punish drug
offenders. He believed that citizens of New York State no longer felt
comfortable with the workings of the criminal justice system and he also
believed that drug treatment facilities lacked the ability to assist with the
drug problem.' Governor Rockefeller saw his laws as an end to
revolving-door justice and a solution to unsuccessful drug treatment.3
Unfortunately, his laws only exacerbated the problems with drugs.
The overall consensus' is that the Rockefeller Drug Laws are
draconian laws that, after a quarter of a century, have not served their
purpose. A study done subsequent to the enactment of the laws has
proven that drug use and drug sales remained the same while the number
of individuals incarcerated increased.1 The study did not come to a
conclusion about the viability of the laws because it was too soon after
they were enacted to make such a conclusion."
To solve the problems of backlogged courtrooms and overcrowded
prisons, it is essential that judges, especially trial court judges who are
most familiar with the facts of a case, regain the discretion to impose
sentences they deem appropriate. The inability of judges to tailor
sentences to the defendant's situation has led to a prison system filled
with low-level nonviolent offenders and drug addicted offenders. The
housing of these prisoners has been at a substantial cost to New York
State.
As they stand now, the laws may be appropriate for major drug
traffickers and drug dealers; but the laws are adversely affecting
minorities and women. The laws are also imprisoning victims of poverty
and domestic violence. As one court put it: "'the tiger trap had sprung
306. See Annual Message, supra note 1,at 2318.
307. See id.
308. See id. The Narcotics Control Act of 1966 established the New York State Civil
Commitment Program, which provided treatment to drug arrestees for three to five years. See
Belenko, supra note 267, at 840. However, the program was unsuccessful because of "the low
quality of treatment facilities and staff associated with the program, the intermingling of parole
supervision with treatment aftercare, high [abandonment] rates, and the prison-like atmosphere of
the rehabilitation centers." Id.; see also Kennedy, supranote 2.
309. Individuals who feel the laws should be changed include, but are not limited to,
Republican politicians who advocated enacting the laws, defense attorneys, judges, Governor
Pataki, and Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye. See, e.g., Dunne, supra note 23 (arguing that the
Rockefeller Drug Laws must be amended to give judges discretion); Pataki Proposal,supra note
209 (discussing Governor Pataki's proposal to change the Rockefeller Drug Laws); Yates, supra
note 209 (criticizing Chief Judge Kaye's proposal and speaking of the need to give trial judges
discretion in sentencing).
310. See generally JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supranote 9 (evaluating the success of the drug
laws).
311. Seeid.atv.
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upon a sick kitten.' ' 12 Judges ought to be able to ensure that the highlevel dealers the laws intended to target are the only individuals to feel
the wrath of the harsh mandatory minimums. It is crucial to return
discretion to the judges who have been appointed because of their ability
to determine what punishment is most appropriate. Without this
discretion, prosecutors will continue to retain a substantial amount of
power in determining sentencing. This power is not reviewable and
prosecutors are not held accountable for wrongly applying the law.
Arizona and Michigan have reformed some of their mandatory
sentences by returning discretion to the judges. 1 3 Yet alternatives
proposed in New York have not been enacted by the legislature.
Furthermore, although the proposals are a start to easing the harsh
effects of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, they do have flaws. The proposals
focus solely on A-I felony convictions but the majority of the
Rockefeller Drug Laws' harsh effects hit those individuals sentenced
under Class D and E felonies. 4
New York has taken a step in the right direction by accepting the
reforms of New York State's Commission on Drugs and the Courts.
Drug treatment has been essential in reducing drug use, drug-related
crime, and, consequently, the costs of drug violations to the state. 5
However, in addition to drug courts, judicial freedom is necessary so
that the judge can decide whether to incarcerate the defendant or send
the defendant into a drug-treatment program. The ability to ensure that
the proper individuals receive treatment and other individuals are sent to
prison must rest in the hands of the judiciary.
Lisa R. Nakdai*

312. Young v. Miller, 883 F.2d 1276, 1285 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Terrebonne v. Butler, 848
F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1988)).
313. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
314. See supraPart IV.A.3.
315. See David I. Goldstein, Letter to the Editor, Reform the Drug Laws, N.Y. L.J., June 29,
1999, at 2.
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